Globalization facilitated an international response to the December 26, 2004, earthquake-tsunami disaster that caused unprecedented devastation in over a dozen countries. The earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter-scale occurred off the west coast of the Indonesian island of Sumatra. This was the fourth largest in the world since 1900, and caused the tsunami that has become the symbol for the disaster. Although determining the precise number of casualties of the tsunami and its aftermath has been difficult, estimates converged around 200,000 dead and 500,000 wounded in late January. The overwhelming majority of casualties were people from the region, but a significant number of tourists were killed. Besides human suffering because of death and sickness, the economic damage to the region is estimated to amount to $10 billion.¹ The impact on the livelihood of large numbers of low-income families living in the coastal regions has been enormous. The outpouring of help from around the world after the tsunami -- from the first media image and the large flow of donations to the actual relief effort and the implementation of an early-warning system —- reflect how interconnected all people and countries have become.

According to many observers the Indian Ocean tsunami was the first global natural disaster in modern times. As one such observer noted:

“This has been the world's first truly global catastrophe, dwarfing any other single event in the emotion and support it has generated and demonstrating graphically that we are indeed one human family, ever more susceptible to common risks and with a shared responsibility to tackle them.”²

A crucial element in creating the circumstances for this global response is the development of the modern media. Within hours of the tsunami there was extensive and graphic coverage of its impact on all major public and private television channels. More novel, the internet, and especially weblogs, provided a distribution-channel for images and first-person accounts. At the same time, however, geographic areas not integrated with the global economy are slow to appear on the Western radar -- if they do so at all. The devastation in Aceh, for example, went unnoticed for days, and the effect on several East African countries has until now been poorly recognized.

The dissemination of images of suffering people had a significant shock-effect in rich countries. The small digital cameras of many tourists provided dramatic live video accounts of the tsunami’s impact. “[A tsunami is] simpler, visual and more dramatic, in ways that both drought and conflict aren't,”³ according to Paul Harvey of the Humanitarian Policy Group, a British thinktank.

And yet some believe the large number of European tourists present in the area increased the concern in the EU and U.S. substantially. Bernard Kouchner, founder of the charity Medicins sans Frontieres, said: "If the Western public had not seen their compatriots stricken by the tsunamis, its response would probably not have been the same."⁴ The effect of this Western presence is especially clear when compared to the Western response to crises of similar magnitude in sub-Saharan Africa where few OECD country citizens were present. Others argue the tsunami was a natural disaster, which produced a more emphatic response than man-made disasters such as the mass-killings in Darfur or the Ethiopian famine of 1984.

The outpouring of help from around the world after the tsunami reflects how interconnected all people and countries have become.

Nonetheless, the distinguishing feature of the reaction to the Indian Ocean tsunami was the unprecedented global response from public and private sectors. Initially, private donors -- both individuals and companies -- were at the forefront of the flood of humanitarian aid for the survivors. This spontaneous expression of compassion combined with intense lobbying pressured governments in the United States, Japan, Australia and the EU to accelerate relief efforts that were critical in saving lives and easing suffering in the region. Additionally, non-governmental organizations (NGO) around the world organized a wide variety of fund raising activities, such as a Tsunami Benefit Concert in Soweto organized by the South African Council of Churches. The UN has also implemented an online financial tracking system to increase transparency. By early February 2005, U.S. relief organizations had raised an estimated $745 million.⁵ Charities said this was an unprecedented response to a natural disaster -- causing the American Red Cross to state it did not need any more gifts.

The global nature of the response was also evidenced by the international efforts and cooperation in ensuring successful disaster relief:

“[P]erhaps the biggest success story coming out of the relief operations is the close working relationships among the armed forces of a number of countries. Approximately 40,000 military personnel from more than a dozen nations have poured into disaster areas around the Indian Ocean to ferry aid. The U.S. and Indian defense forces together deployed more than 32,000 troops, sailors, and aircrew in what is for each its biggest international peacetime relief effort. Even Japan has deployed around 1,000 troops -— its largest military mission for disaster assistance since World War II.”⁶

The global response has also affected the use and distribution of received funds. A large number of international NGOs with offices in a wide range of countries organized to implement disaster relief projects on a local level. An NGO called Mercy Corps, for example, has deployed over 60 emergency staff members to affected areas in Indonesia. Their efforts are reaching over 100,000 displaced and vulnerable Indonesians. Mercy Corps established an innovative program called "Cash for Work" that has already put hundreds of local people to work. They clear debris and rebuild damaged infrastructure in return for about $3.30 plus lunch for a day of seven and a half hours -- roughly the standard wage for unskilled labor in the region. A different group earns more, about $5.60 a day, but their task is more trying: they collect bodies being unearthed by the dozen. Oxfam, an NGO headquartered in Britain, has also adopted the Cash for Work model and currently employs 4,360 people in Banda Aceh.

An organization called Mercy Corps has reached more than 100,000 displaced and vulnerable Indonesians.

States remain the most important players in such rescue and reconstruction effort. Cooperation and synergy between different governmental agencies and NGOs proved essential for a successful operation. The U.S. Army, for example, has unparalleled logistical capability (i.e. helicopters, aircraft carriers and personnel) that proved indispensable for the delivery of emergency food aid and clean drinking water. The administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) recounted an anecdote of
cooperation between USAID and the military:

“The Abraham Lincoln, offshore at Banda Aceh, could produce tens of thousands of gallons of potable water. The only problem was that there was no way to get it to people on shore. Herbie [a USAID Food for Peace Officer] immediately went out and bought a huge number of water jugs from local markets throughout Indonesia and arranged with the military to get the jugs transported to the Abraham Lincoln. Military personnel then filled the jugs with clean water, and helicopters distributed the water in Aceh.”⁷

Furthermore, the response to the tsunami has been cited as an exemplary case of coordination between the military and non-military U.S. departments that was lacking in Iraq. The Department of State worked together with the Department of Defense behind the scenes to “secure status of forces agreements, permission for [the U.S.] military to use foreign airspace and territorial waters to conduct relief operations.”⁸ This speedy intervention prevented massive additional deaths as a result of drinking ‘bad’ water.

At the same time, the politics of nationalism reared its ugly head in the response process. On December 29, President Bush announced that the United States, Australia, Japan and India would form a "core group" to lead relief efforts. Despite arguments this group had either geographic proximity, or necessary resources or both, this initiative drew criticism from various governments accusing the U.S. of excessive reliance on ‘coalitions of the willing,’ rather than multilateral bodies. The ‘core group’ model was seen as a political tool to increase influence of the group members in the region. Subsequently, as the UN stepped up its operational and logistic capacity in the region the U.S. welcomed the initiative of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), led by Jan Egeland, to coordinate private and public efforts internationally. UN leadership in this area helped prevent a turf-war between donor countries.

The response to the tsunami has been cited as an exemplary case of coordination between the military and non-military US departments that was lacking in Iraq.

On the receiving end of the aid there were some national ‘sovereignty’ complications as well. The governments of Sri Lanka and Indonesia were reluctant to allow excessive involvement by other countries in tsunami-impacted areas that are politically sensitive because of tensions with local separatist movements. India also refused external aid to help it cope with the tsunami, because of a combination of national pride, geopolitical motives and the conviction that India could deal with its own problems.

The importance of international, and internationally coordinated, assistance extends beyond the emergency phase. One of the instruments planned to aide affected countries in rebuilding their economies is trade preferences. The European Union, for example, will lower its tariffs towards, among others, Sri Lanka and Indonesia to boost their exports to the EU.⁹ The countries of the region have also made a special effort to lure tourists back to their deserted beaches by public relations campaigns targeted to the main generating markets, including advertisements on German television; an increased presence on the South Asia Travel and Tourism Expo (SATTE) in New Delhi; and the accelerated rebuilding of capacity.¹⁰ According to the World Tourism Organization, tourism is the best way for people to provide aid to the region.

Significant efforts are also underway to create an early-warning system to mitigate the impact of future tsunamis. Jan Egeland of OCHA said studies have shown that every $1 spent on disaster reduction can save $10 by limiting the need for subsequent relief –- and, of course countless lives. “The way the world now works, it is a better world in so many ways because we have technology.”¹¹ In late January 2005, representatives of 43 countries from South Africa to Russia and New Zealand to Canada agreed to establish an early-warning system in the Indian Ocean based on the same advanced technology used in the system that is in place in the Pacific Ocean.¹²

This international response to one of the worst natural disasters in human history underscores the extent to which people around the world feel increasingly part of the same whole and have increasing means at their disposal to act upon this feeling. At the same time, technological advances have not overtaken politics. Cooperation between groups of people –- both domestically and internationally -— still face serious obstacles from nagging nationalism.

¹Times Online, "Insurers Count Tsunami's Economic Cost," December 29, 2004.

²Garet Evans, "Optimism Rises After the Tsunamis," Financial Times, January 11, 2005.

³The Guardian, "How the Tsunami Hogged the Headlines," March 11, 2005.

⁴BBC News, "Public Opinion Pushes Governments," December 31, 2004.

⁵The Chronicle of Philanthropy "U.S. Relief Charities Bring In $745-Million for Tsunami Victims," February 9, 2005.

⁶CSIS, "South Asia Monitor Number 79," February 1, 2005.

⁷Testimony of Andrew Natsios (Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development) Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

⁸Testimony of Alan Larson (Under Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State) Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

⁹European Commission, "Commission Accelerates Preferential Trade Measures to Benefit Tsunami-hit Countries," February 10, 2005.

¹⁰For more information on tourism recovery, see: " Tsunami Disaster - Tourism Recovery."

¹¹Jan Egeland, "Asia Society Briefing: Tsunami Disaster Relief Efforts," January 13, 2005.

¹²For full-text of declaration, please see: Ministerial Meeting on Regional Cooperation on Tsunami Early Warning Arrangements Phuket, Thailand, January 28-29, 2005.






Reprinted with permission from Globalization101.org.

To read another Global Envision article about the effects of globalization on the world, see Globalisation's Underbelly.