There is a natural synergy between China with its 1.3 billion commodity-hungry inhabitants and Latin American countries rich in natural resources. China’s imports from the region have grown from $1.5 billion in 1990 to $22 billion last year. While this is still a small percentage of China’s international trade, these are significant numbers for Latin American countries.

China is now the second largest trading partner for Peru; the third largest for Chile; the fourth largest for Brazil and Argentina; and trade with China now falls within the top 10 for Paraguay and Uruguay. ¹ And mutual commercial interest goes beyond trade and only appears to be growing. In November 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao flew to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba, where he signed a total of 39 bilateral agreements with these countries in the areas of trade, investment, aviation, space flight, tourism and education. The President also pledged that China would invest over $100 billion in Latin America during the next decade.

In the interview that follows, Ricardo Rivas, a journalist for the Chinese news agency “Xinhau” and Sub-Secretary of Media Communications for the Argentine Presidency from 1999 to 2001, provides insights into the realities of the Chinese presence in Latin America and challenges readers to appreciate the complexity of the relationships and the politics involved.

Janie Hulse: Economic interactions between China and some Latin American countries are clearly on the rise. Which countries have the strongest relationships with China, and what kind of activity is taking place?

Ricardo Rivas: At present, China’s principal Latin American commercial partner is Chile; the country recently signed a free trade agreement with China similar to the one it already has with the United States. Chile is also an active member in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which promotes liberal trade and economic policies along the Pacific Rim.

Uruguay also maintains an extensive relationship with China, which goes beyond commercial exchange to include cultural and educational exchanges. Interestingly, Chile and Uruguay provide China with bi-oceanic reach with Chile on the Pacific and Uruguay on the Atlantic.

China’s imports from Latin America have grown from $1.5 billion in 1990 to $22 billion last year. While this is still a small percentage of China’s international trade, these are significant numbers for Latin American countries.

China’s economic relations are not exclusive to Chile and Uruguay, however. For a long time, China’s state enterprises have worked with the Brazilian company Embraer in airplane production, and Brazil and China also collaborate with educational exchanges.

Argentina and China also have a commercial relationship but it asymmetrically benefits Argentina. Argentina sells soy and other primary products to China amounting to about 11% of Argentina’s total exports while Chinese imports to Argentina only amount to about 0.6% of total Chinese trade. This trade imbalance is owed in part to Argentina’s protective measures against Chinese products like shoes and automobiles that result in competition for Argentine domestic industries.

We are also seeing overtures between China and Bolivia, Venezuela and Mexico in the energy sector. And of course, Chinese companies dominate the Panama Canal operations. Peru, with its 2 million Chinese descendents and immigrants is also increasing trade with China, and business negotiations between the countries are facilitated by Chinese speaking Peruvians.

JH: Who is pushing these increasing ties? The Chinese Government? Chinese Businesses? Latin American governments? Latin American businesses? Is it part of a comprehensive strategic plan or are these economic affinities emerging spontaneously?

RR: This is an excellent question as many journalists tend to simplify and even personify States when actually the reality of who is involved is always more complex. Most Chinese investment operations in Latin America, for example, tend to be made by mixed private and state enterprises and not by the government itself. There is a tendency in the Latin American press –especially in Argentina – to exaggerate “China’s” interest in investing in the region. This could be used as a domestic political maneuver or to annoy traditional powers like the U.S. and Europe.

JH: Do the relationships between China and the Latin American countries go beyond commercial interests? Is there a political affinity between the increasingly left-leaning Latin American countries and politically communist China?

The battle of the 21st century is less ideological than it is commercial, and international forums like the WTO provide the battle grounds.

RR: Here we enter into the complex debate of what it means to be “left” or “communist” and whether or not the Latin American countries and China qualify as either. For example, there are many differences between the “left” promoted by Fidel Castro in Cuba; Hugo Chavez in Venezuela; Evo Morales in Bolivia; Nestor Kirchner in Argentina; and now Michele Bachelet in Chile. And the notion of “left” for the West is different from what is considered progressive for the indigenous populations beginning to gain power in Latin America. Even the “right” is harder to define today; just look at Chilean conservative presidential candidate Piñera’s disassociation from the past military regime and its abuses.

The battle of the 21st century is less ideological than it is commercial, and international forums like the WTO provide the battle grounds. We are experiencing a power shift from a Cold War bi-polar world to a multi-polar world with powers such as the United States, Japan, the European Union, and China. Africa has disappeared, and Latin America remains somewhat of a mystery. China is also enigmatic with its politically communist regime and capitalist economics. At present, the Chinese and Latin American connection is pragmatic and mutually beneficial and not so much ideological.

JH: What can we expect to see from China in Latin America in the coming years?

RR: China will continue to develop relationships based on exchange while respecting other countries’ autonomy. It will not impose its interests. In the short and medium term, it won’t replace U.S. “hegemony” in the region. China still needs to define domestic issues related to its own economic and social development. It needs to first organize itself at home before projecting its growing power on others.

1. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)figures extracted from Andres Oppenheimer’s article “China seeks materials, political allies”, Miami Herald, September 25, 2005.




Janie Hulse is a writer for Global Envision and a Rotary World Peace Fellow working toward a PhD in International Relations at the Universidad del Salvador in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Ms. Hulse has a Masters degree in Politics of Development in Latin America from the London School of Economics (1998) and has worked extensively with and in the region in both the public and private sectors.

To read another Global Envision Interview about Globalization, see Globalization and Health: An Interview With Julio Frenk.



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